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MODERATE PRESENTISM 
FRANCESCO ORILIA 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Typical presentism asserts that whatever exists is present. Moderate presentism more modestly 
claims that all events are present and thus acknowledges past and future times understood in a 
substantivalist sense, and past objects understood, following Williamson, as “ex-concrete.” It is 
argued that moderate presentism retains the most valuable features of typical presentism, while 
having considerable advantages in dealing with its most prominent difficulties. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 Standard or typical presentism (TP, in short) claims that  
 
(P) whatever exists is present. 
 
Thus, in particular, TP asserts the following: 
 
(NE) there are no past or future events or states of affairs;  
(NT) there are no past or future times (moments); 
(NO) there are no past objects; 
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(NO’) there are no future objects.1 
 
TP enjoys a number of attractive features, which cohere with our commonsensical view of time and of 
ourselves as temporal beings. Following Zimmerman (2008, p. 211), we may thus even say that TP is 
“innocent until proven guilty.” Yet, TP must also confront some serious problems and the many 
solutions that have been proposed are far from having reached consensus. In response to this situation, I 
would like to put forward a moderate presentism (MP, in short). It intends to address TP’s main 
difficulties, by dropping (NT) and (NO), and to preserve TP’s most appealing aspects, by holding fast to 
(NE). To simplify the discussion, I shall concentrate on issues concerning the past and avoid as far as 
possible those regarding the future; thus, for example, the notorious truthmaker problem will be 
discussed only in relation to past-tensed propositions. Accordingly, I shall leave it open here whether 
MP should also drop (NO’). 
 To show that MP delivers what it promises, I shall proceed as follows. In §§ 2 and 3, I shall 
present MP in more detail by relating it to the most immediate motivation for dropping (NT) and (NO): 
the need to account for the reference of dates and backward singular terms, as we may call them, i.e. 
terms such as “Socrates” and “Bucephalus,” seemingly standing for past objects such as Plato’s teacher 
and Alexander the Great’s horse. Next, I shall seek further support for MP in two complementary ways. 
On the one hand, I shall argue, in § 4, that MP retains the most valuable aspects of TP, which should 
make the moderate presentist not too sad for the “eternalist concessions” that she makes. On the other 
hand, I shall illustrate, in §§ 5 and 6, how these concessions give the moderate presentist elbow room in 
dealing with the two most well-known challenges for presentism, namely, those coming from 
truthmaking and cross-temporal relations, respectively.2 
                                                 
1 I use “event” and “state of affairs” interchangeably. At least for present purposes, we do not need to distinguish between 
them. I use “object” to refer to ordinary or theoretically posited particulars such as cats and chairs or quarks and leptons, and 
not as an extremely generic umbrella term (like “entity”) that ranges inter alia over events and times. 
2 In this paper I develop some ideas only sketchily outlined in some previous works (REFERENCE OMITTED). 
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2. Dates 
 
 What do dates refer to? As Meyer (2013) has recently emphasized, no theory of time can elude 
this question and of course presentism is no exception. One might think that the issue could be 
sidestepped by eliminating dates in favor of metric tense operators, as suggested by Prior (1967, Ch. 6). 
But how are we to interpret the indices that these operators are equipped with? If we do not want them 
to signal an implicit quantification over times, we need take them as generating predicates standing for 
attributes (properties or relations) with the following features: (i) they are past-tensed, like having been 
tired or having kissed, and (ii) they attribute primitive and unanalyzable degrees of pastness or futurity. 
Examples of such attributes could be having been tired 66929 seconds ago or having kissed 1894057 
seconds ago. We may call them metric past-tensed attributes. Presentists have appealed to them. For 
example, in dealing with the truthmaker problem Zimmerman (2008, p. 218) invokes the metric past-
tensed property of having been occupied by a dinosaur 150,000,000 years ago (calling it a ‘backward-
looking’ property).3 But this is hardly better from the point of view of ontological economy and 
commonsense intuitions than having (primitive) times, and indeed there may be advantages with the 
latter option. Once we have times, we can replace metric past-tensed attributes with time-indexed 
attributes such as having been tired at t, where t is a past time. To the extent that the time in question is 
past, the time-indexed attribute is, we may say, past-tensed just like metric past-tensed attributes (hence 
                                                 
3 Alternatively, as proposed by McKinnon and Bigelow (2011, p. 257), the presentist who does not want to be committed to 
times could acknowledge primitive metrical past-tensed exemplification ties, such as having been exemplified 66929 seconds 
ago, by means of which objects exemplify with a certain degree of pastness untensed attributes like tiredness and kissing. 
McKinnon and Bigelow argue for the superiority of this approach to metricality and more generally for the superiority of 
tensed exemplification ties over tensed attributes. For present purposes nothing crucial hinges on this and thus I shall set 
McKinnon’s and Bigelow’s proposal aside. 
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the appropriateness of the locution “having been”). However, as we shall see, in dealing with the 
truthmaker problem the time-indexed properties may be handier for the presentist than the metric ones. 
 Let us then assume that we need referents for dates, i.e., times (or moments). In deciding what 
they are, there are three ways to go (see, e.g., Meyer, 2013, Chs. 3, 2 and 6, respectively). According to 
substantivalism, times are primitive, irreducible entities; according to relationism, times are reduced to 
classes of simultaneous events or, in a mereological fashion, to gigantic events involving as parts 
“smaller” simultaneous events such as someone’s being tired or two lovers’ kissing; according to 
Ersatzism, times are reduced to maximal and consistent propositions (or sentences), Ersatz times, which 
represent total states of the world and become true one after another, depending on which total state of 
the world is realized. Relationism is clearly not available to a presentist, whether typical or moderate, for 
it commits one to past and future events. Ersatzism is a rather common option for the presentist (Prior, 
1967; Bourne, 2006; Crisp, 2007). It has however been claimed that that it cannot be endorsed without 
circularity (Craig, 2000, p. 213; Le Poidevin, 1991, p. 54; Oaklander, 2010a), at least from a presentist 
perspective (Meyer, 2013, Ch.9). The arguments in favor of this alleged circularity must be carefully 
evaluated, something which I do not plan to do here. They give in any case at least a prudential reason to 
endorse the only other option left open, namely substantivalism. The moderate presentist is thus inclined 
to take it,4 since it is not in contrast with the appealing features of presentism to be reviewed in § 4, and 
may also have other advantages, which I shall now briefly indicate. 
 First, avoiding Ersatzism is more in tune with commonsensical intuitions (Hinchcliff, 1996, p. 
124).5 Relatedly, viewing times in a substantivalist fashion, rather than as propositions, possibly makes 
                                                 
4 Despite the many objections traditionally raised against it (see, e.g., Meyer, 2013, Ch. 3). These will have to be answered 
somehow, but this issue goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
5 Hinchcliff makes non-Ersatzist past and future times compatible with TP, by acknowledging them in his ontological 
inventory, while declaring them, in a Meinongian fashion, non-existent. He plays a similar gambit with past (and future?) 
objects. In contrast, I do not deny that such entities exist, at least as regards past objects (more on this in the next section), 
and I thus shift from (P) to the more modest (MP). 
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two stories that MP can offer more plausible: the accounts of truthmaking and of causation based on 
time-indexed attributes (to be considered in § 5 and § 6, respectively). Furthermore, with substantivalism 
one can easily ground the intuition that there can be time passage without change (Shoemaker, 1969; 
Markosian, 2014, §2; Newton-Smith, 1980, Ch. 2). Finally, substantivalism provides an account of the 
direction of time, which has been seen as a problem for the presentist (Oaklander, 2002; 2003). 
Oaklander argues in these works that the presentist is in trouble when it comes to time direction, 
because she cannot appeal to the temporal precedence relation freely available to the B-theorist. With 
substantivalism in place, however, this relation can be purchased, for of course substantivalist times 
must be viewed as ordered by an unalterable precedence relation, so that, e.g., the noon of October 13, 
1867 necessarily precedes the noon of August 11, 2023. And thus the moderate presentist can say that 
presentness shifts from one moment to another in the order given by the precedence relation. 
 In endorsing substantivalist primitive times, MP bears some analogy to the view recently put 
forward by Zimmerman (2011) in an effort to make presentism compatible with general relativity. For 
he acknowledges space-time points understood in a substantivalist fashion and thus in particular past 
and future space-time points. In Zimmerman’s approach there is a commitment to a Galilean space-time 
without an absolute relation of being at the same place at different times. In contrast, in a Newtonian 
conception of space and time, there is such a relation. MP is simply committed to times, rather than to 
space-time points, and is thus compatible with the Newtonian conception. This compatibility is an asset, 
since forcing an agreement with general relativity in the way suggested by Zimmerman may not be the 
best way to make presentism square with current physics; perhaps, a neo-Lorentzian approach that 
salvages the Newtonian conception of space and time is a better option (see, e.g., Smith, 2008). For this 
conception is certainly closer to commonsense in neatly separating time from space, and vicinity to 
common sense is a virtue to which the presentist should be sensitive. This is not the place however to 
investigate this issue, for we are rather trying to bring to the surface the advantages that MP has over TP, 
and Zimmerman’s view hardly counts as a version of TP, precisely for its just noted resemblance to MP. 
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Of course, in spite of this resemblance, there is a sharp divergence regarding past objects, to which MP 
is committed and Zimmerman’s view is not. We now turn to this. 
 
 
3. Backward terms 
 
 Backward singular terms such as “Caesar” and “the first Roman emperor” can hardly be placed 
in the same lot with terms such as “Pegasus” or “the golden mountain.” Unless we are of a Meinongian 
orientation, we feel some pressure to say that the former refer and the latter do not. (And even if we 
follow the lead of Meinong, we should presumably acknowledge that there is some difference here that 
should be captured.) Presentists have either bitten the bullet and refused to acknowledge that the former 
refer (thereby being forced to embrace some form of descriptivism that views proper names as 
descriptions in disguise) or have appealed to individual essences, thisnesses, haecceities, or the like, 
which many philosophers find too esoteric or otherwise problematic. 
 MP wants to explore a different line, according to which backward singular terms should be 
taken at face value as referring to the very same objects they used to refer when they were not, so to 
speak, backward. This option should be judged as closer to common sense than the aforementioned 
alternatives, if one considers that backward terms like “Caesar” or “Napoleon” appear to be treated in 
everyday discourse as referring expressions just like “Clinton” or “Obama,” with no indication that this 
involves a commitment to individual essences or something similar. To secure a referent for backward 
terms in the way that I am proposing one can appeal to Williamson’s (2002) suggestion, according to 
which merely past objects have not really ceased to exist, but have rather become ex-concrete.6 Here is how 
Williamson puts it:  
 
                                                 
6 Although I call ex-concrete objects past, there is a sense in which they can still be considered present entities: it is always at 
the present time that they enjoy whatever attributes they manage to exemplify, in spite of their peculiar ontological status. 
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Trajan ... is no longer anywhere; he lacks spatial location: ... he is no longer concrete. But he 
still counts for one when we ask 'How many Emperors of Rome were there?' ... the past 
tense formulation with 'were' of course does not mean that at some past time there were 
n emperor of Rome, for they were not all Emperor simultaneously ... He became 
something neither abstract nor concrete ... an ex-concrete object. 
 
Williamson puts forward his ex-concrete objects in a very general context, without taking a stand in the 
A vs. B controversy in the philosophy of time. What I propose to do here is to import them into a 
presentist perspective, a move that Williamson presumably would not approve.7 
 To admit these ex-concrete objects does not of course in any way commits to a plethora of 
Meinongian objects such as the winged horse or the round square; nor does it oblige one to speak with 
the Meinongians and say that there are objects that do not exist, thereby being forced to distinguish the 
garden variety existentially loaded “there are” from a “there are” devoid of existential commitment 
(Williamson, 2013, § 1.5): in taking the ex-concrete objects to have lost the concreteness that they once 
enjoyed, there is no need to deny that they exist. 
 It could be objected that ex-concrete objects are just as hard to digest as thisnessess and similia, 
and that, despite the above remarks on ordinary discourse, that they are similarly distant from common 
sense. The main reason for this worry is presumably the idea that that properties such as being abstract 
or concrete are essential properties and thus cannot be lost. But while this claim is hard to deny for 
abstract objects such as numbers, it becomes less obvious when we consider that we appear to keep 
talking about past objects, while predicating of them only attributes that do not imply a spatial location. 
For instance, we attribute to them past-tensed properties such as having been an emperor at (past) time 
                                                 
7 Zimmerman plausibly attributes to Williamson the spotlight view of time rather than presentism (Zimmerman, 2008, p. 
215). The option of combining ex-concrete objects with presentism has been considered very without approval by De Clercq 
(2006, § 6) and by Caplan and Sanson (2011, § 4) (very briefly) and by Sider (2011, § 11.9) (a bit more extensively). In this 
paper, inter alia, I am exploring this suggestion and arguing that it deserves approval. 
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t, and also present-tensed intentional relations such as being referred to, being remembered, admired, 
loved or hated. Hence, after all, a commitment to ex-concrete objects is more in tune with common 
sense than the label “ex-concrete” might suggest. 
 Of course, no matter how hard we try to make ex-concrete objects palatable, they may still seem 
somewhat mysterious and raise concerns in the ontologist. Yet, as Williamson (2013) makes it clear, an 
appeal to them must ultimately be judged in terms of theoretical costs and benefits, in comparison with 
other approaches that try to dispense with them, perhaps replacing them with “surrogates” of some sort. 
And in this comparison the fact that these intentional relations are truly attributed certainly gives an 
advantage to the supporter of ex-concrete objects. For she can take these attributions at face value, 
without having to overcome, in the words of McKinnon’s and Bigelow’s (2012), an “aboutness worry.” 
This worry arises for the typical presentist when, in dealing with the attributions in question, she appeals 
to “surrogates” of past objects:8  
 
There is an “aboutness worry” that can be pressed against all these surrogates. At the funeral, 
Elise’s son seems to be talking about Elise; that she is the subject of his thoughts seems to be 
what makes his eulogy a deeply emotional experience, both for himself and his audience–it seems 
important that they are all thinking of the same thing, namely Elise herself. None of the 
proffered surrogates appear to be subjects capable of drawing this touching speech from her son. 
McKinnon and Bigelow, 2012, p. 260. 
 
 We have dealt only with object backward singular terms. But there are also event backward terms 
such as “the meeting of Garibaldi and Vittorio Emanuele II in Teano.” As regards event backward 
terms, MP is in the same boat as TP: neither approach is willing to admit past (ex-concrete?) events as 
                                                 
8 Thisnesses or the like may not be the only options in the search for surrogates. McKinnon and Bigelow, following the lead 
of Keller 2004, list still existing concrete physical objects, places, the whole world, bits of matter, particles, words. We may 
add, as suggested by *** <reference suppressed>, the space-time points of Zimmerman, 2011. 
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their referents, for reasons to be discussed in the next section. Since here I wish to focus mainly on what 
differentiates these two views, I shall be very brief on this point, although it may well deserve more 
attention than it has attracted so far. Very roughly, as I see it, the presentist should understand event 
backward terms as standing for propositions. For example, the sentence “the meeting of Garibaldi and 
Vittorio Emanuele II in Teano on October, 26, 1860, 8:30 a.m. was observed by several witnessess” can 
be interpreted as “many witnesses observed that Garibaldi and Vittorio Emanuele II met in Teano on 
October 26, 1860, 8:30 a.m.” Of course the proposition corresponding to an event backward term may 
well be true (as in the example we just considered) and this of course leads us to the truthmaker problem 
for presentism. As regards it, I think that MP fares better than TP, as we shall see in turning to this issue 
below. But first let us make sure that the purchase of times and ex-concrete objects does not come at 
too high a cost. 
 
 
4. The motivations for presentism 
 
 Let us now briefly review TP’s most valuable features with the goals of (i) reassuring us that for 
the most part they are preserved in MP and (ii) evaluating the costs of what is lost. 
 TP is an A-theory of time and as such it acknowledges the objective difference between past, 
present and future rejected by B-theories, but dear to common sense. In total or partial contrast with 
other A-theories, such as the spotlight, growing-block and branching future views, however, TP does 
not take past and future items as existing, while somehow lacking presentness or having a different 
mode of being or degree of reality; it simply does not acknowledge their existence. Following the lead of 
Prior (1959; 1996), Zimmerman (2008, p. 214) urges that this is an important advantage for the 
following reason. When painful or pleasant experiences are over, we are relieved or disappointed, as the 
case may be, and the nonexistence of past events is the simplest explanation of our reliefs and 
disappointments. Spotlighters and pastists (as both growing-blockers and branching futurists may be 
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called) must instead provide some other account of why the becoming past of the events in question 
should elicit relief or disappointment, given that this becoming past is not a ceasing to exist. (B-theorists 
of course must face similar concerns.) Clearly, MP can claim the same advantage as TP here. 
Zimmerman (2008, p. 215) however claims this further benefit for TP: it does not have to worry about 
making sense of what happens to an object when it becomes past, without however ceasing to exist. And 
of course TP can also set aside the analogous concern about times. Obviously, MP cannot claim the 
same assets at this juncture. But this is not so bad, because the existence of past objects and past and 
future times is not as hard to believe as that of past and future events. Let us see why. 
 The problems that past and future events raise are especially striking when one reflects on those 
events that involve sentient beings undergoing joy and sorrow, and thus, unsurprisingly, Prior, 
Zimmerman and several other presentists have focused on them. In confronting them, the non-
presentist has a predicament well-explained by Zimmerman (2008, p. 215): 
 
... if past headaches are to be much better than present ones, these A-theorists [spotlighters, 
pastists] must say things like: a headache is only truly painful when it is present; yesterday’s 
headache, although it exists, is no longer painful ... and that’s why it no longer concerns us. ... 
Although this view makes sense of our relief when pain is past ... it has less appealing 
consequences as well. Headaches can exist but not be truly painful. 
 
Thus, either there is my having a headache at t (where t is a past time) and yet this event is not painful, in 
which case my relief is unjustified, or my having a headache at t lacks painfulness by virtue of its 
pastness, in which case there is a headache but no pain, which seems impossible. 
 Zimmerman thinks that past objects raise analogous problems; the above quotation continues 
thus: “a horse can exist although it is not actually alive or even spatially located ... a physical object can 
survive a change in which it ceases to have any shape or size.” Thus, Zimmerman is suggesting that the 
acceptance of past objects leads us to implausibly admit horses devoid of life, shape, size and spatial 
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locations just as the analogous view about events forces us to admit headaches that do not hurt. But 
really this is not so. In the acceptance of ex-concrete objects there is no commitment to horses, or other 
beasts, or more generally physical objects such as tables and stones, strangely devoid of all their usual 
physical characteristics. There is rather a commitment to objects with past-tensed properties such as 
having been a horse (at a certain time), or having been a table (at a certain time), without in the least being 
forced to say that these objects are horses or tables. Thus, for example, we should not say that 
Bucephalus is a horse, since there is no state of affairs like Bucephalus’ being a horse. Yet, Bucephalus 
has the property of having been a horse and accordingly there is the state of Bucephalus’ having been a 
horse, which is compatible with Bucephalus’ not being alive, not occupying space and lacking size and 
shape. Of course, ex-concrete objects may have been involved in joyful or painful events, but, with past 
events denied, there is no worry that this should lead us to admit headaches that are not truly painful or 
the like. Suppose for instance that Bucephalus had a headache at past time t. Then it has the property of 
having had a headache at time t and accordingly there is the state of affairs of Bucephalus’ having had a 
headache at time t. But this is not a headache event that is not truly painful; simply it is not a headache 
event, for it does not involve the property of having a headache, but the property of having had a 
headache. 
 How about past and future times? How bad is it to come to terms with their losing futurity as 
they become present and their acquiring pastness as they lose presentness? We can come to grips with 
this as follows. Given that only present events exist, only the present moment is such that there are 
events at it. So to speak, it is the only moment that “hosts” events, whereas the other moments are 
“empty.” These other moments are future or past, depending on whether they follow or precede this 
only moment replete with events. But as soon as a moment hosts events and is thus present, it 
immediately “loses” them, and a following moment comes to host events, so that presentness, hosting 
events, keeps shifting from one moment to another. Thus, the becoming present of a moment is its 
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coming to host events and its becoming past is its becoming empty.9 It should be clear that this picture 
does not reinstate any worry of headaches that do not hurt or pleasures that do not please. For example, 
the past time t at which Bucephalus had a headache does no longer host the event of Bucephalus’ having 
a headache. Indeed, this event is hosted nowhere, because there simply is no such event. Of course, the 
present moment hosts the event of Bucephalus’s having had a headache at time t, but, as explained 
above, this event is no headache event.10 
 An important point that has been recently put forward in favor of presentism is this:  in contrast 
with other A-theories of time, it does justice to the intuition that, upon reflection, we always know that 
we are in the present (Bourne 2002; Braddon-Mitchell 2004). If only the present exists, I am always 
justified in believing that I am in the present, whenever I ask myself where I am temporally located. But 
if there are the past or future events granted by pastists and spotlighters, I could rather suspect to be in 
the past or in the future. One might worry that this advantage is lost once past objects and moments are 
admitted: couldn’t I be a past object? This concern can be immediately defused, however. The past 
objects admitted by MP are ex-concrete objects, which, as such, can at best have properties such as 
having wondered about being in the present or not, but not the property of wondering about being in the 
present or not. As I wonder about being in the present or not, I can thus be reassured that I am not ex-
concrete (cf. Sider (2011, p. 311)), nor can I doubt that my reflection occurs at a moment other than the 
present one, given that all the other moments are empty. 
 A commonly adduced asset for both presentism and pastism is their being in line with the 
commonsense intuition that the future is open. This can even be seen as a distinguishing feature of both 
                                                 
9 There is a sense in which past and future times can also be considered present entities: as I see it, it is always at the present 
time that they precede or follow, as the case may be, the present time. I realize this is a controversial point that need be 
further articulated, but I shall leave this task for another occasion, since nothing crucial hinges on it for the main purposes of 
this paper. 
10 For reasons I discuss in *** (reference omitted), the moments that host events had better be pointlike durationless instants 
(this does not mean that moments understood as extended intervals cannot be acknowledged). 
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views (Stoneham, 2009), a feature that has been magnified as necessary to make adequate room for free 
will (see, e.g., § 1 in Markosian, 2014 and references therein). Eternalists of course have rebutted (see e.g. 
Oaklander, 1998), but the issue keeps coming up. For example, Diekemper (2007) has recently insisted 
that that there can be no open future, without the pastist or presentist rejection of future events. That 
this matter is particularly thorny is testified by the recent work by Barnes and Cameron (2009; 2011), 
who criticize Diekemper (Barnes and Cameron, 2009, p. 305), on the basis of their conception of the 
open future as indeterminacy. This conception is controversial, but my task here is not to settle these 
issues and thus I need not engage with such difficult matters. I simply need to make it clear that 
whatever advantages presentists and, in this case, pastists have, are preserved by the moderate presentist. 
Now, as Barnes and Cameron recognize, denying future entities is at least one way to secure an open 
future (Barnes and Cameron, 2009, p. 305). More precisely, what is relevant is the denial of future events, 
which MP grants just like presentism and pastism. This denial is unscathed by the admission of future 
times, for, as we saw, they are conceived of as empty. And of course the denial would stand even if MP 
should turn out to accept (some) future, not yet concrete, objects. If they were admitted, they might 
exemplify, just like present concrete objects, future-tensed properties such as going to be F at (future time) 
t. One might suspect that the present exemplification of such properties would compromise the openess 
of the future just like the admission of future events. But this is so only if, for every object x, property F 
and future time t, x has the property of going to be F at t. And of course the moderate presentist has no 
need to grant this. 
 Arguably, an important aspect of presentism’s alignment with common sense is its capacity of 
preserving the image of ourselves and the ordinary objects surrounding us as three-dimensional beings 
that wholly exist where they are spatially located, as opposed to segmented entities made up of temporal 
parts, as the eternalist must have it (Merricks, 1995).11 Clearly, this three-dimensionalism has nothing to 
do with the admission of empty non-present times and ex-concrete (or not yet concrete) objects, for it 
                                                 
11 Although Mellor (1998, p. xii and Ch. 8) has disputed this point, most eternalists acknowledge it and indeed Merricks’ 
arguments seem to me decisive. 
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simply rests on the rejection of past and future events. Consider for example a previously straight and 
now bent stick. For it to be three-dimensional, what matters is that there are present events such as the 
stick’s being bent and the stick’s having been straight, rather than a straight stick-slice followed by a bent 
stick-slice. And all this the moderate presentist can happily grant. 
 TP is often praised for its ontological parsimony. MP might be accused to have an inferior 
degree of this virtue, because of its commitment to times and ex-concrete objects. But of course 
ontological parsimony is not an absolute value and gains center stage as one among other theoretical 
virtues only at the level of theory comparison, when one evaluates the explanatory success of different 
approaches in dealing with the same relevant phenomena. Hence, the moderate presentist can bring to 
the fore the explanatory advantages granted by its additional ontological commitments in facing the 
reference problems that we have already discussed, and the other issues that we are about to consider. 
And it is far from obvious that these commitments are any worse than those that the typical presentist is 
disposed to endorse, in order to overcome the same obstacles.  
 
 
5. Truthmaking 
 
 According to the plausible truthmaker principle, what is true depends on what exists, or, to put it 
otherwise, truth supervenes on being. This principle is commonly taken to imply that at least some true 
truthbearers, typically understood as propositions, require truthmakers, i.e., items in reality that make 
such truthbearers true. Some have qualms about propositions and characterize truthbearers differently, 
but for present purposes nothing hinges on assuming propositions. There is also disagreement over the 
range of true propositions that require truthmakers, but there is widespread agreement on the 
assumption that at least atomic present-tensed propositions, e.g., that Bill is talking or that John is 
kissing Mary, require truthmakers, typically conceived of as states of affairs (see, e.g., Rami, 2009; 
MacBride, 2014). The notorious truthmaker problem for presentism arises from the acceptance of the 
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truthmaker principle and the acknowledgment that there are true past-tensed (atomic) propositions that 
appear to require truthmakers just like present-tensed atomic propositions (see, e.g., Oaklander, 2010b). 
There is a problem because the presentist cannot provide truthmakers by appealing to past items, as an 
eternalist or pastist might do. The debate typically concentrates on undated truths, e.g., 
 
(1) Garibaldi was awake 
 
or 
 
(2) Garibaldi and Vittorio Emanuele II met in Teano. 
 
But of course one should also consider dated truths such as 
 
(1a) Garibaldi was awake on October 26, 1860 at 8:30 a.m. 
 
or 
 
(2a) Garibaldi and Vittorio Emanuele II met in Teano on October 26, 1860 at 8:30 a.m. 
 
 One could react by rejecting the truthmaker principle or, rather extremely, the very idea that 
there are true past-tensed propositions (see Caplan and Sanson, 2011, §§ 2 and 3 and references therein). 
Most presentists however have preferred to set these options aside and have looked for “proxies” of 
past objects and events that can work as (constituents of) present truthmakers for past-tensed 
propositions. Accordingly, there are many versions of TP committed to all sorts of exotic present 
entities. For example, Bigelow’s Lucretianism (1996) appeals to past-tensed properties that the world as a 
whole exemplifies, e.g., the property of being such that Garibaldi and Vittorio Emanuele II met in Teano 
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(which I dub WM for later convenience);12 Keller’s heacceitism (2004) appeals to present haecceities of 
past objects and times; Bourne’s (2006) and Crisp’s (2007) Ersatzism appeal to a precedence relation 
linking Ersatz times. 
 The moderate presentist must also face a truthmaker problem, since past events are not available 
to her as well. However, by invoking times and ex-concrete objects, she can provide a different story, 
possibly more appealing at least for certain philosophical tastes. I shall illustrate how this additional 
appeal may materialize by comparing MP to Lucretianism and then by focusing on two constraints that 
may be imposed on truthmaking. But let us first see what the different story is. 
 According to MP, ex-concrete objects presently exemplify time-indexed past-tensed attributes 
such as having been awake on October 26, 1860 at 8:30 a.m., or having met in ... on October, 26 1860 at 
8:30 a.m. (to be called A and M, respectively, for brevity’s sake). Hence, the moderate presentist can 
propose the following as truthmakers for true past-tensed propositions: present events involving (i) past-
tensed time-indexed properties or relations and (ii) objects, whether concrete or ex-concrete, as the case 
may be. For example, the truthmaker for (1a) is the present event consisting of Garibaldi’s exemplifying 
property A. Similarly, the truthmaker for (2a) is the present event consisting of the joint exemplification 
of relation M by Garibaldi, Vittorio Emanuele II and the still concrete town Teano. The same events can 
of course work as truthmakers of the less specific propositions (1) and (2).13 
                                                 
12 Bigelow draws on Lucretius, who however, as noted by Bigelow himself, takes properties of this sort to be exemplified by 
sections of matter or portions of space.  
13 An advantage of admitting ex-concrete objects is this: by recourse to them we can easily provide truthmakers for past-
tensed “counting” propositions such as that there were two Charles of England kings, which Lewis (2004) finds embarrassing 
for presentism. For instance, MP can take the latter proposition to have a truthmaker jointly constituted by the two states of 
affairs of Charles I’s having been King of England and Charles II’s having been King of England (since a similar advantage 
could be gained otherwise, e.g., by recourse to haecceities, I do not present this there as a reason for preferring MP to TP). 
One might suspect however that there are also counting propositions regarding past events, which should similarly suggest a 
recourse to past events; for example, the proposition that there were two deaths of Charles of England kings. Following the 
suggestion made at the end of § 3, however, talk of past events should be appropriately reformulated in presentist-friendly 
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 This approach is similar to Lucretianism in appealing to past-tensed properties, but it seems to 
me that at least a couple of issues with respect to which the former performs better than the latter can be 
pointed out. First of all, the nature of the Lucretian properties is yet to be clarified. On the one hand, it 
seems we should take them as primitive and unanalyzable. For otherwise one may suspect that the 
Lucretian is committed to ex-concrete objects just like MP, since in order to express her past-tensed 
properties she uses complex predicates, e.g. “being such that Garibaldi and Vittorio Emanuele II met in 
Teano,” involving singular terms such as “Garibaldi” and “Vittorio Emanuele II.” Yet, the need to 
appeal to such predicates, with individual parts having their own meanings, pulls in the direction of 
taking the corresponding properties as not primitive after all. For otherwise it would be like claiming that 
the property expressed by “being in love with Mary” is primitive, while acknowledging that we cannot 
express this property without talking about Mary and the relation of being in love.14 In contrast, the past-
tensed properties of MP do not entangle us in a similar difficulty. They are expressed by predicates that 
incorporate the past tense and a date, but we make sense of this, since MP allows us to understand the 
date as referring to a past time. 
 Second, the past-tensed properties typically put forward by Lucretianians, e.g. WM or being such 
that there were dinosaurs, may at best be sufficient for undated truths, but clearly they are not enough 
for dated truths. For of course that the world exemplified WM is not enough to discriminate between a 
truth such as (2a) and a falsehood such as the one expressed by “Garibaldi and Vittorio Emanuele II met 
in Teano on October, 26 1850 at 8:30 a.m.” Clearly, dated past-tensed propositions require metric 
                                                                                                                                                                    
terms. Thus, we should say that it was the case twice that a Charles of England king died. And for this proposition the 
moderate presentist can put forward a truthmaker jointly constituted by the events of Charles I’s having ceased to be alive 
and Charles II’s having ceased to be alive. *** (reference omitted) has asked why, once we renounce past and future events, 
we could not renounce events altogether. As I see it, once we admit that things have properties and stand in relations, which 
can hardly be denied, we ipso facto admit that there are states of affairs or events, so that the world, as Armstrong (1993) puts 
it, is basically a world of states of affairs. And, as Armstrong has insisted, to find a truthmaker for, e.g., the proposition that 
this sheet is rectangular, it is not enough to have the sheet and rectangularity, we also need the sheet’s being rectangular. 
14 Analogous criticisms of Bigelow’s Lucretianism can be found in Oaklander, 2002. 
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Lucretian properties such as WM154y1d2m, i.e. being such that Garibaldi and Vittorio Emanuele II met in 
Teano 154 years, 1 day and 2 minutes ago (unless of course the Lucretian leans toward MP by 
acknowledging past times and thus time-indexed properties). With such properties at hand, the Lucretian 
can say, for example, that (2a) is made true by the world’s exemplifying WM154y1d2m, on the assumption 
that (2a) is expressed on October 27, 2014 at 8,32 a.m. Unfortunately, this option is at odds with the no 
shifting intuition, according to which the truthmaker of a true proposition should not change in time 
(Davidson, 2013, p. 159).15 Suppose for instance that (2a) is expressed on October 28, 2014 at 8,33 a.m. 
In this case the truhmaker is different, it is no longer the world’s exemplifying WM154y1d2m, but rather the 
world’s exemplifying a different metric property, namelyWM154y2d3m. In contrast, from the point of view 
of TP, with primitive times available, one can do justice to the no shifting intuition: the truthmaker for 
(2a) remains constant, as it is always Garibaldi’s having the time-indexed property M. 
 Truthmaking, one could argue, is ruled by a relevance constraint, according to which the truthmakers 
of true propositions must be items such that these propositions are about them (Smith 1999, §6; 
McBride, 2013, §1.1). It has been argued that versions of TP with present proxies of past truthmakers, 
such as Lucretianism, haecceitism and Ersatzism, are doomed to fail in the light of this relevance 
constraint (Merricks, 2007, p. 137; Baron, 2013). The alleged reason is that true past-tensed propositions 
are “about the past” (as Baron puts it in most of his paper) and thus a fortiori the present proxies cannot 
meet the constraint, since they are present rather than past items. Now, the claim that past-tensed 
propositions are about the past seems too generic and not really in line with the typical demands of 
                                                 
15 Davidson makes this point in criticizing a Lucretianism that claims that a truth such as (2) is made true by the state of 
affairs of Garibaldi’s and Vittorio Emanuele II’s meeting in Teano as long as Garibaldi and Vittorio Emanuele II exist, but 
then is made true by the world’s being such that Garibaldi and Vittorio Emanuele met in Teano as soon as Garibald i or 
Vittorio Emanuele II cease to exist. Clearly, MP does not have this problem, but I shall not press this point, since 
Lucretianism, as Davidson recognizes, can simply claim that all past-tensed truths are made true by the world’s instantiating 
past-tensed properties, even if these truths involve present objects such as Obama or the Eiffel tower. (Davidson thinks this 
is not sufficient to solve the problem at issue for Lucretianism. I do not think he is right, but this point need not concern us 
here.) 
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truthmaking theory. For example, the truthmaker theorist would not claim that the proposition that 
Obama is talking is simply “about the present,” but more specifically about some present item, say 
Obama (Smith 1999) or the state of affairs of Obama’s talking (Armstrong, 1993). By analogy, one could 
argue that the proposition that Obama was talking is about Obama or a certain state of affairs involving 
Obama. Indeed this seems to be what the critic that appeals to the relevance constraint seems to have in 
mind. For example, in a passage with a more careful wording Baron says: “past-directed propositions 
should be true ... because of how things were ... the relevant propositions are about how things were” 
(Baron 2013, p. 549). Which things? Presumably, the things referred to by the singular terms in the 
relevant sentences, e.g. the terms “Garibaldi” and “Vittorio Emanuele II” of the sentences expressing 
propositions (1) and (2). However, even assuming this more circumscribed way of understanding the 
constraint, there is no way in which TP can meet it.16 For of course the critic will insist that, if a 
proposition such as (1) is about Garibaldi or a state of affairs involving him, then a fortiori it cannot be 
about what the supporters of TP propose as truthmakers for the proposition in question, i.e., (a state of 
affairs involving) the world as it presently is (without Garibaldi), or a present haecceity or an Ersatz time. 
In contrast, by admitting ex-concrete objects, MP can claim that true past-tensed propositions are about 
what makes them true. For example, (2) is about Garibaldi, Vittorio Emanuele and Teano or rather 
about a certain state of affairs involving them. And this state of affairs is the truthmaker of the 
proposition in question. In line with the critic’s demand, one could add, the proposition in question is 
“about how things were,” because in the corresponding state of affairs the relevant objects, Garibaldi, 
Vittorio Emanuele II and Teano, are related by a past-tensed relation. 
 Caplan and Sanson have argued that it is not enough, for the presentist to meet the truthmaker 
principle, that she simply provides truthmakers of some sort. For one should do this while also meeting 
an explanation constraint, according to which the proposed truthmaker for a given proposition must 
explain why the proposition is true (Caplan and Sanson, 2011, § 4.2 and references therein, Sanson and 
Caplan, 2010). On this basis these two philosophers have criticized many versions of TP, including those 
                                                 
16 Merricks (2007) thus rejects the truthmaker principle rather than presentism. 
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that appeal to past-tensed properties such as Lucretianism (Sanson and Caplan, 2010, §3). As against 
these approaches they urge, for example, that the truth of the true proposition that Arnold was pale is 
not explained by an alleged truthmaker such as Arnold’s instantiating the past-tensed property of having 
being pale. For it is rather the case that the true proposition in question is true because Arnold once had 
the property of being pale (Sanson and Caplan, 2010, p. 26). Similarly, they could object to MP by saying 
that what explains that (1a) is true is not the event consisting of Garibaldi’s instantiating A. It is rather 
that once, at time t, Garibaldi was awake (or instantiated the property of being awake). 
 Perhaps the explanation constraint or the use that Caplan and Sanson make of it could be 
questioned, but I am interested here in showing that, if one takes it seriously, there is some advantage in 
endorsing MP rather than TP. We can see this by turning to Kierland’s (2013) attempt to meet this 
challenge. Strictly speaking, Kierland does not try to meet the explanation constraint, qua constraint on 
truthmaking, for he replaces the truthmaker principle with a “truth-explanation principle” requiring that 
true propositions are explained in terms of what exists or does not exist and how existing things are or 
are not (p. 177). But for present purposes this detail does not matter much, and thus let us look at the 
crux of his proposal: “there is a sui generis law of history which governs how the world character at one 
instant causally determines which trace properties it possesses at later instants” (p. 187). Trace properties 
are properties that the world now has, as a causal effect of the world’s having been in a certain way. For 
example, since the world was such that (2a) was true, the world now exemplifies a certain trace property, 
which we may conveniently call TM. Kierland suggests that, by putting together the law of history, call it 
LH, and the current instantiation by the world of the trace properties, we get the explanation of the true 
past-tensed propositions that Sanson and Caplan require. Thus, for example, that (2a) is true is jointly 
explained by LH and the world’s instantiating TM. 
 The insistence on causality is in my view misplaced, and I would rather talk of some sort of 
metaphysical necessitation in stating the law of history. Next, I would replace Kierland’s trace properties 
with my time-indexed properties of (ex-concrete) objects. Finally, in keeping with the truthmaking 
principle, I would insist that the law of history can be appealed to, together with a truthmaker, in 
21 
 
providing the explanation that Sanson and Caplan require (although the truthmaker per se, contrary to 
what they seem to demand, cannot provide the entire explanation). Otherwise, I think that Kierland is 
on the right track. This is not the place to argue for this, since I have the more modest goal of 
underlining the advantages of MP over TP. And here they are. First of all, the ex-concrete objects of MP 
allow one to meet the relevance constraint in the way suggested above, i.e. by taking it somehow at face 
value. In contrast, Kierland proposes that it should be met in a roundabout way on the basis on this 
scheme:  “what a sentence or belief is about has to do with a certain kind of cognitive role involving its 
deployment in reasoning and imagination” (p. 206). Second, the primitive times of MP seem required to 
make sense of Kierland’s law of history, for in stating it we seem to quantify over all instants. With 
primitive times (and ex-concrete objects) available, MP could propose something like the following more 
explicit version of the law of history, which we may call LH*: for every instant t, property F and object 
x, the occurrence at t of an event consisting of the exemplification of F by x metaphysically necessitates, 
for any instant t’ later than t, the occurrence at t’ of an event consisting of the exemplification by x of the 
property of having been F at t. (An analogous law for relations is of course needed.) With LH* in place, 
we can then say, for example, that the truth of (2a) is jointly explained by LH* and Garibaldi’s 
instantiating A. Thus, strictly speaking, it is not (2a)’s truthmaker, namely Garibaldi’s instantiating A, that 
explains (2a)’s truth, but rather the joint existence of the truthmaker and LH*. But the truthmaker plays 
a crucial role in the explanation and in this sense the explanation constraint is met. 
 I hope this suffices to show that MP offers some interesting advantages in facing the truthmaker 
problem. Let us then see more of what MP can offer, by turning to cross-temporal relations. 
 
 
6. Cross-temporal relations 
 
 Intuitively, at least prima facie, there are cross-temporal relations that link past and present entities, 
e.g., reference, admiration, ancenstorship, higher height, causation. This of course raises a worry for 
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presentism. Presentists have taken the problem seriously (see. e.g., Markosian, 2004; De Clercq, 2006) 
and opponents of presentism have even claimed that it is insoluble (Torrengo, 2008). 
 Ex-concrete objects can offer an obvious way out as long as the relation in question involves 
objects. For example, in the light of §§ 3 and 5, it should be clear that MP can take at face value true 
propositions such as these: 
 
(3) a token of “Socrates” refers to Socrates; 
(4) Putnam admires Quine. 
 
In other words, MP can understand these propositions as made true by present states of affairs involving 
both a concrete and an ex-concrete object. 
 Similarly, MP can take pretty much at face value these true propositions: 
 
(5) Edward II is an ancestor of Queen Elisabeth II; 
(6) Obama is taller than Napoleon. 
 
Of course, some analysis may be required. For example, we may want to appeal to Obama’s having a 
certain height now and Napoleon’ having had a different height at a certain past time. But the crucial 
idea is clear: MP can take advantage of states of affairs involving ex-concrete objects (and times) as 
constituents. 
 Things get muddier when we turn to causation. For simply invoking ex-concrete objects does 
not help in this case, since (at least in typical accounts) the causal relata are events, and MP rejects past 
events just like TP. A full-fledged presentist-friendly account of causation goes beyond the scope of this 
paper, but, in order to bolster MP, it is possible to at least offer a sketchy idea of how its time-indexed 
properties and the ex-concrete objects could be an asset in providing such an account.  
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 Before seeing how, let us note that not all accounts of causation are problematic for the 
presentist. Bourne (2006) discusses various analyses of causation and argues rather successfully that, 
whichever we accept, the presentist can deal with it. But all the analyses in Bourne’s list are more or less 
deflationist approaches, e.g., Humean and counterfactionalist approaches. The real challenge for the 
presentist comes when we turn to realist accounts of causation, e.g., those that view it as transference of 
a physical quantity such as energy (Dowe, 2008, § 7). Let us then turn our attention to this sort of 
approach, in order to highlight how the moderate presentist’s resources can be useful. 
 For illustration, let us concentrate on the paradigmatic case of a moving billiard ball, b1, that, 
upon colliding at time t1 with the billiard ball b2, causes b2 to move. If so, the following proposition is 
true: 
 
(7) the collision of b1 at t1 with b2 has caused b2 to move. 
 
Assuming an energy transfer approach, we must admit, very roughly speaking, that (7) is true because a 
certain amount of kinetic energy, k, previously in b1, is now in b2. To account for this, the moderate 
presentist cannot say that there is a past event such as b1’s having energy k, connected by the k-transfer 
relation to a present event, namely b2’s having energy k. Nor can she take “the collision of b1 at t1 with 
b2” at face value as standing for a past event. Yet, she can provide a truthmaker for (7) by invoking 
present past-tensed events, e1k, and e1c, that cooperate with the relevant present events e2k and e2c, i.e. b2’s 
having energy k, and b2’s moving. The past-tensed present events e1k, and e1c can be characterized, 
respectively, thus: the former consists of the exemplification by b1 of the time-indexed property of 
having incorporated kinetic energy k at time t1, and the latter consists of the joint exemplification by b1 
and b2 of the time-indexed property of having collided at time t1. In sum, MP can offer e1k, e1c, e2k and e2c 
as jointly constituting the truthmaker for (7), a truthmaker certainly in the spirit of Dowe’s energy 
transfer approach. 
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 To see the importance of the moderate presentist’s appeal to times in this approach, consider a 
typical presentist that does not want to be committed to them and thus trades metric past-tensed 
properties for MP’s time-indexed properties. For example, rather than appealing to e1k, she could invoke 
an event consisting of b1’s having incorporated kinetic energy k a moment ago. The cost is the shifting 
truthmaker problem considered in the previous section. For as time goes by and (7) remains stably true, 
she will have to provide ever different truthmakers for it, say b1’s having incorporated kinetic energy k 
two moments ago, b1’s having incorporated kinetic energy k three moments ago, and so on. 
 To see that ex-concrete objects can also have a significant role, let us make our case study a bit 
less paradigmatic. Suppose now that the ball b1 explodes immediately after its collision with ball b2. With 
ex-concrete objects available, we can still admit that b1, though now ex-concrete, exemplifies time-
indexed past-tensed attributes, in particular those that are relevant to the case at issue, e.g. having 
incorporated kinetic energy k at time t1. The kind of analysis put forward in the paradigmatic case is thus 
preserved. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
 By making its eternalist concessions, moderate presentism gains significant benefits in dealing 
with the main difficulties that afflict typical presentism. Yet, moderate presentism retains crucial features 
of typical presentism; possibly, all those that make it a peculiarly interesting and valuable theory of time. 
There are certainly many issues that I have not discussed here and that need be investigated for a more 
thorough assessment of moderate presentism. Yet, I hope to have at least shown that it is an approach 
worth serious consideration. 
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